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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds. 
Understanding the behaviour of the overnight market for unsecured loans is important both from a 
policy as well as from a research point of view. The basic reason is that this market hosts the first step 
in the monetary transmission mechanism. There is a long literature analysing this mechanism, that is, 
the process by which central banks are able to affect their ultimate goals of policy through changes in 
policy instruments under this context. However, most of the papers in this literature simplify matters 
by assuming central banks have direct control of a short-term interest rate (see, for example, Taylor 
(1999) or McCallum (1999)). Here, we construct a theoretical model of the money market to explicitly 
analyse how this control is actually exerted.  
 
There are several issues we address with this model. First, we look at the linkages between the 
statistical properties of the equilibrium in the overnight market and the operational framework of 
monetary policy. We see this as a necessary step in order to address questions about the effects of 
changes in the design of the central banks’ operational framework. Relevant features include reserve 
requirements, length of reserve maintenance periods, existence of standing facilities, maturities and 
frequency of open market operations, etc. Second, although the model cannot be estimated directly, we 
use a set of testable implications to take it to the data. It turns out that the model is able to reproduce 
the most salient features that characterise the overnight interest rates in the euro area. 
 
Most available empirical studies on the high frequency behaviour of overnight interest rates focus on 
the US case. References include Campbell (1987), Lasser (1992), Rudebusch (1995), Roberds et al. 
(1996), Hamilton (1996), Balduzzi et al. (1997), Furfine (2000) and Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2001, 
2002). Prati, Bertola and Bartolini (2002) argue that some of the empirical facts identified for the US 
are no longer relevant when alternative institutional settings are considered. The case of a “corridor 
system” is particularly relevant. In a corridor system overnight market interest rates are bound by the 
existence of two standing facilities provided by the central bank, with pre-determined interest rates. A 
deposit facility where banks can deposit their excess clearance balances, earning a given return and a 
lending facility which provides access to liquidity, at a given interest rate, against the pledging of 
eligible collateral. Outside the US the “corridor system” has been adopted by a series of countries 
during the last decade, namely Australia, Canada, Denmark, the euro area, New Zealand, Sweden, and 
the UK. Since the start of the ECB’s single monetary policy in 1999, a significant amount of research 
has been devoted to identifying the relevant empirical facts characterising the euro’s market for 
overnight funds. Relevant references include Angeloni and Bisagni (2002), Cassola and Morana 
(2002), and Würtz (2003). In this paper we pursue this empirical research programme further by 
considering lending rates charged by individual banks. To our knowledge, this is the first paper in the 
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literature to address the determination of rates from this point of view, particularly focused in the Euro 
area. Specifically, we use data on individual banks to study the joint statistical distribution of 
overnight rates over time and over the cross section of banks. 
 
In our research we have been able to use the EONIA panel database, kindly made available by the 
European Banking Federation (EBF). This database includes daily information on the lending rates 
applied by contributing commercial banks. The data clearly shows an increase in both the time series 
volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. 
These increases are highly correlated. With respect to quantities, we find that the volume of trade as 
well as the use of the standing facilities are also larger at the end of the maintenance period. These 
facts motivate the modelling strategy in the paper. 
 
Most of the theoretical models of daily funds market equilibrium have evolved from the early seminal 
contribution by Poole (1968).1 Some of the papers in this literature are Angeloni and Prati (1996), 
Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2001, 2002), Henckel, Ize and Kovanen (1999), Pérez-Quirós and 
Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2003) and Woodford (2001). All these models share a main ingredient: the 
existence of a “liquidity shock” that creates uncertainty in the liquidity management of commercial 
banks and that we interpret in terms of imperfect information. Specifically, the idea is that commercial 
banks trade in the overnight funds market before they are able to determine their end-of-day balance 
with certainty. Furfine (2000) interprets this residual uncertainty as coming from “operational glitches, 
bookkeeping mistakes, or payments expected from a counterpart that fail to arrive before the closing 
of Fedwire”. In other words, credit institutions have less than perfect information and monitoring 
systems.  
 
Usually these models are only concerned with the evolution of prices so they model representative 
agent economies. They are pure pricing models. However, in order to be able to explain the joint 
distribution of prices and quantities both in the time as well as in the cross section dimension, one 
needs to allow for heterogeneity plus some form of market segmentation. In this paper we provide a 
model with heterogeneous commercial banks subject to idiosyncratic shocks. These banks interact 
with the central bank through payment systems and the operational framework of monetary policy. 
The model provides a stylised representation of the relevant institutional features for the euro area. 
Commercial banks also interact with each other through the payments mechanism and the daily funds 
market. A form of market segmentation will prevent efficient netting, the verification of the law of one 
price, and will generate a distribution of interest rates across banks. It delivers testable propositions on 
                                                     
1 See also Baltensperger (1980) for a survey and references to the early literature on this subject. 
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the behaviour of interest rates over time and across banks, use of standing facilities and amounts 
traded. These are the propositions we confront with the empirical evidence.2 
 
Market segmentation might look as an ad hoc proposition to model money markets, much more when 
banks exchange an extremely homogeneous good, reserves. However, talking with money market 
dealers of different private banks of the Euro area, it seems a plausible representation of the reality of 
money markets. The reasons usually argued by the practitioners not to have a single market are the 
existence of credit limits or agents playing a reputation game. According to the dealers, being short 
one day by a big amount is a piece of information they do not want to share with the general market. 
So, they prefer to pay more to settle their accounts privately with banks they usually do business with. 
Therefore, there are subgroups of trading banks that settle with each other before going to the general 
market or the standing facilities. 
 
The design of the theoretical model is intended to replicate some of the basic features of the daily 
market for funds in the euro area. In doing so, we try to account for the most important elements of the 
operational framework for monetary policy. Our economy consists of a central bank and n commercial 
banks. These banks exchange overnight deposits in segmented markets and are subject to liquidity 
shocks. Commercial banks have to maintain a given level of required reserves on average during a 
reserve maintenance period. As in the Eurosystem, the central bank offers two standing facilities: a 
lending and a deposit facility. The two standing facilities define a corridor limiting the fluctuation in 
the overnight rate. We show that such an environment reproduces the main features of the market for 
funds in the euro area. In particular, the equilibrium in the model is characterized by rates whose time 
series as well as cross section volatilities increase towards the end of the maintenance period and are 
highly correlated. Furthermore, banks trade and use the standing facilities more at the end of the 
maintenance period. 
 
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Every day banks face two risks. On the one hand, an 
unforeseen decrease in available funds may make a commercial bank use the lending facility. This is 
costly because the lending rate is larger than the market rate. On the other hand, in the opposite case of 
an unforeseen increase in available funds, a bank may fulfil reserve requirements early on during the 
reserve maintenance period, a case in which we say the bank is being “locked-in”. This is also costly 
because the marginal value of reserves accumulated beyond the requirement is the deposit rate which 
is smaller than the market rate. Thus, when banks determine how much funds to supply to the market 
                                                     
2 Furfine (1999), as Furfine (2000), uses transaction-level data. He looks at trading patterns and networks and 
finds evidence on the existence of relationship banking in the interbank market. Furfine does not explicitly 
address the theoretical modelling of bank heterogeneity together with market segmentation. 
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on every day of the maintenance period, they will look at how their decisions affect the probability of 
ending the day with an overdraft as well as the probability of being “locked-in”. Given an initial 
amount of reserves, if banks had the same supply of funds on every day, the probability of having an 
overdraft would be constant over time. However, the probability of having excess reserves would get 
larger as we approach the last days of the maintenance period. To compensate for this latter effect, 
banks try to hold relatively fewer reserves on the first days of the period and relatively more towards 
the end so as to reduce the probability of satisfying the reserve requirement early in the period. 
 
The adjournment in the accumulation of reserves by banks has a further implication. As the end of the 
maintenance period gets nearer, the ability of banks to offset past shocks decreases. This makes banks 
more sensitive to shocks as time passes so that the elasticity of supply becomes a decreasing function 
of time. Thus, at the beginning of the period the supply of funds is very elastic. Banks are basically 
indifferent between different holdings of reserves, so they do not have the need to compensate 
liquidity shocks. They trade little and the interest rates are very similar both across banks and across 
time. On the last days of the period, though, supplies are inelastic so that shocks late in the period will 
have a larger effect on prices. Introducing market segmentation in this setting makes the cross section 
as well as the average across banks become more volatile towards the end of the reserve maintenance 
period. Furthermore, trade is also larger on the last days of the period as banks try to get their desired 
level of reserves. This larger trade happens both between banks and with the central bank through the 
use of the standing facilities. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the theoretical model. In Section 3 we 
solve the model and present the expressions that determine the demand for funds on each day of the 
maintenance period. Because the model cannot be solved explicitly, in Section 4 we perform 
numerical simulations in order to illustrate the properties of the model. Section 5 contains a 
description of the data set, which includes the daily contributions from individual banks used to 
compute the EONIA rate. The properties of the data are examined in Section 6. In Section 7 we model 
the time-series and cross-section behaviour of interest rates in the daily funds market in a systematic 
way. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
In the model we consider n commercial banks and one monetary authority, the central bank. 
Commercial banks maintain deposits, called current accounts, with the central bank in order to fulfil 
reserve requirements and payments responsibilities. The operational framework of the central bank is 
composed of two elements. The first one refers to certain restrictions on the current accounts hold by 
commercial banks. Reserve balances of commercial banks cannot be negative by the end of each 
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trading session and the accumulated balance over each reserve maintenance period has to be large 
enough to meet required reserves, that is, it cannot be smaller than a number R > 0. This number R 
corresponds to the level of required reserves and is pre-determined. The reserve maintenance period 
has a length of T days. The second element consists of two standing facilities provided by the central 
bank. There is a lending facility where banks can borrow funds at the interest rate il and a deposit 
facility where banks can deposit funds at the rate id. These facilities are always available to 
commercial banks 
 
The main decision each bank has to make on every day is to determine how much funds to trade on the 
money market. In deciding the amounts to borrow or lend in any session, banks take into account their 
reserve position. The position of bank j = {1, 2, …, n} is summarised by its current account with the 
central bank at the time it reaches the market on day t, jta , and the amount of reserves the bank has to 
accumulate from session t until session T to satisfy its reserve requirement, also known as its 
deficiency, jtd .
3 Assume that all banks start day 1 being identical, that is, RDd jt == 1  and 1Aa jt = . 
The pair jts  = (
j
t
j
t ad , ) defines the individual state of a bank on any particular session. 
 
In every session, banks are subject to shocks. In the general description of the model we distinguish 
between pre-trade shocks ( jtε ), that is, shocks that arise early in session t, before bank j exchanges 
funds in the market, and post-trade shocks ( jtλ ), which represent late shocks that arise after trade takes 
place. We restrict these shocks to be i.i.d. across time. They follow the distributions: 
 
( )jjjt F εεε σµε ,~  
and 
( )jjjt F λλλ σµλ ,~ , 
 
where jiµ  is the mean of the shock i = ε, λ for bank j and jiσ  is its standard deviation. Notice shocks 
are assumed to follow distributions that may differ across banks and not necessarily independent 
among them. 
 
The timing of events between two sessions is as follows: consider a bank, say j, that is about to enter 
the market on day t. The bank has a deficiency jtd  and an account balance of 
j
ta . Let 
j
tm  and 
j
tb  be 
                                                     
3 In general, lower case letters refer to individual banks while capital letters refer to per capita market aggregates. 
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the amount of reserves kept by this bank and the ones loaned out to the market at session t, 
respectively. These magnitudes have to satisfy 
 
  jt
j
t
j
t abm =+   (1) 
and 
   0≥jtm . (2) 
 
After the bank leaves the market, it receives the late shock ( jtλ ), so the balance at the end of the day in 
bank j’s current account is  
j
t
j
t
j
t mr λ+= . 
The following day, the bank receives an early morning shock ( jt 1+ε ), so tomorrow’s balance at the 
central bank by the time bank j goes again to the market is 
 
  jt
j
t
j
t
j
t aa 11 ++ ε+λ+= . (3) 
 
Notice that any reserves exchanged on any day have to be returned the following day. Additionally, 
we make the simplifying assumption that interest payments on borrowing and lending are not 
capitalised. Reserve deficiencies, jtd , evolve over time as 
 
   ]},0max[,0max{1
j
t
j
t
j
t rdd −=+ , (4) 
 
for t < T . That is, the reserve balance of the bank at the end of the session ( jtr ) is accumulated only if 
it is positive and deficiencies have a lower bound of zero. Because current accounts cannot be negative 
overnight, all reserves maintained in the central bank after the accumulated balance of a bank reaches 
the reserve requirement R are kept in excess and remunerated at the deposit rate. 
 
Given market rates, the distribution of shocks, the distribution of banks over individual states and the 
evolution of those states, banks decide on borrowing and lending in order to maximise the expected 
sum of profits over all T sessions 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ π∑
=
T
t
j
tE
1
1 , 
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where E1 is the expectation with respect to the information set at the beginning of trading session 1. 
Let jti  be the interest rate at which bank j exchanges reserves in the market at the session t. The profits 
of this bank on any day, are  
  jt
j
t
j
t
j
t cbi −=π , (5) 
where jt
j
t bi  are the revenues (costs) from lending (borrowing) funds in the market at the rate 
j
ti  and 
j
tc  represents the end-of-session costs derived from going to the deposit and lending facilities of the 
central bank.  
 
The particular expression for the costs of using the facilities, jtc , depends on the day of the 
maintenance period. For the last day of the period, these costs are  
 
 ][)(][)( jT
j
T
j
T
j
T
j
T
j
T
dj
T
j
T
j
T
j
T
j
T
j
T
lj
T mdImdimdImdic λ+<λ−−−λ+≥λ−−= , (6) 
  
where I[a] is an indicator function that takes value 1 when the statement in brackets is true. If the 
balance of the bank at the end of the day ( jT
j
Tm λ+ ) is not enough to fulfil the deficiency (so that 
j
T
j
T
j
T md λ+≥ ), the bank will have to borrow the difference from the lending facility. Otherwise, if the 
bank accumulates excess reserves ( jT
j
T
j
T md λ+< ) they will be deposited at the deposit facility earning 
the rate id. Since in equilibrium the market rate is between id and il, the bank will use the facilities only 
if it has to. For the rest of days, t < T, the costs of using the facilities are 
 
 ][)(]0[)( jt
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
dj
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
lj
t mdIdmimImic λ+<−λ+−λ+≥λ+−=  . (7) 
 
If the balance of the bank at the end of the day is negative (that is, jt
j
tm λ+≥0 ), the bank will have to 
borrow the necessary funds from the lending facilities to set it to zero. Otherwise, if the bank 
accumulates excess reserves ( jt
j
t
j
t md λ+< ) they will be deposited at the deposit facility earning the 
rate id.  
 
3.  SOLUTION OF THE MODEL 
 
The way to solve this problem is by backward induction. We first solve for the individual supplies of 
funds in the market at time T and work backward towards the first period. 
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3.1 The last day of the reserve maintenance period (T) 
 
The problem of bank j on the last day T can be written in dynamic programming form as follows. Let 
);( T
j
TT SsV  be the value function defined as the maximized profits of bank j at the last day of the 
period given its individual state jTs  and the aggregate state TS . This function satisfies: 
 
 )(max)(max);( jT
j
T
j
TTb
j
TTb
T
j
TT cbiEESsV j
T
j
T
−=π= , (8) 
with jTc  defined in (6). The first order condition for a maximum is 
 
  ])(1[)( jT
j
T
j
T
dj
T
j
T
j
T
lj
T abdFiabdFii −+−+−+= λλ . (9) 
 
This expression says that banks determine their supply of funds to the market in order to equate the 
marginal revenue of lending an additional unit of reserves with the expected marginal cost of that unit 
when reserves are needed, that is, when they are computed for the reserve requirement. These costs are 
il when the bank is overdrawn [with probability )( jT
j
T
j
T abdF −+λ ], and id when the bank has excess 
reserves [with probability )(1 jT
j
T
j
T abdF −+− λ ]. From this expression we observe that the supply of 
reserves of bank j, jTb , is increasing with its initial level of reserves (
j
Ta ), the rate at which the bank 
exchanges reserves in the market ( jTi ), and it is decreasing with the reserve deficiency (
j
Td ), the 
lending rate (il) and the deposit rate (id). Furthermore, the partial derivative of the value function with 
respect to jTd  is  
  jTj
T
T
j
TT i
d
SsV −=∂
∂ );(
. (10) 
 
Remember from (9) that the supply of reserves on the last day of the maintenance period depends 
negatively on the level of deficiency. Therefore, the opportunity cost of starting the last day of the 
reserve maintenance period with one more unit of deficiency is equal to the market interest rate lost. 
 
4.2 Days before the last (t < T) 
 
Define the value function as  
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[ ] [ ]);(max);(max);( 111111 ++++++ +−=+π= tjttjtjtjttbtjttjttbtjtt SsVcbiESsVESsV jtjt , 
 
where the costs of using the facilities, jtc , are defined in (7). Using the evolution of 
j
td 1+  in (4), the 
first order condition with respect to jtb  gives 
 
 [ ]−−+−+−= λλ )(1)( jtjtjtdjtjtljt abdFiabFii  
  jt
j
t
j
t
j
tj
t
t
j
tt
abd
ab
dfdf
d
SsV
j
l
j
l
j
l
j
l
j
l
λλ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ εε∂
∂− λ++ε
+
+++
∞
∞−
−+
−
∫∫ )()();( 11
1
111 .  (11) 
 
which generates the supply of funds on sessions t < T. Notice, it depends on the marginal value of 
reserves on the next session as measured by the partial derivative of the value function but only in 
those instances when the bank is accumulating reserves. As before, banks equate the marginal revenue 
with the marginal cost of supplying funds. For any t < T, the partial derivative of the value function 
with respect to jtd  is 
 
  [ ]+−+−−=∂∂ λ )(1);( jtjtjtdtjt t
j
tt abdFi
d
ssV  
  jt
j
t
j
t
j
tj
t
t
j
tt
ab
dfdf
d
SsV
j
l
j
l
λλ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
εε⎢⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+ λ++ε
+
+++
∞
∞−
−
∞−
∫∫ )()();( 11
1
111 .  (12) 
 
The intuition of this expression is as follows. The cost of having a unit of deficiency more on day t, 
depends on the situation of the bank at the end of the day. If the bank ends up the day locked-in, 
starting day t with a larger deficiency has a low value, the deposit rate. This event happens with 
probability [ )(1 jt
j
t
j
t abdF −+− λ ]. This is the first term of the right hand side of (12). In all other 
cases, a larger deficiency increases jtd  permanently and the value of this event is determined by 
j
t
j
t dV 11 / ++ ∂∂ . This is the second term.4 
 
                                                     
4 It turns out that for days t far from T, ∂Vt/∂dt ≈ -it, so that from (11) the martingale hypothesis only holds 
conditioned on banks accumulating reserves. See Pérez Quirós and Rodríguez Mendizábal (2003) for an analysis 
of this point. 
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In general, explicit expressions for the solution of this model are not available for days t < T. In 
section 4 we present numerical simulations to show the main results. However, some intuition is 
available from the form of the expressions that define the solution. From (12) we see that in 
determining their supply of funds, banks care about the cases where the reserve problem is at a corner, 
that is, when the bank is overdraft ( jt
j
t
j
t ab −≤λ ) or “locked-in” ( jtjtjtjt abd λ≤−+ ). Because being 
“locked-in” is an absorbing state, the probability of reaching it increases over time which makes banks 
postpone the accumulation of reserves. Also, we can see that there will be use of the standing facilities 
before day T. This will happen if a bank has a negative current account at the end of the day (use of 
lending facility) or is locked-in (use of deposit facility). Finally, the distribution of interest rates and 
trade will depend upon the distribution of the individual states jts  = (
j
t
j
t ad , ). This means that changes 
in policy will, in general, affect the equilibrium distributions. In particular, level shifts in which the 
central bank changes the reserve requirement, R, in the same amount as the initial reserves, A1, are not 
neutral. Changing the initial level of reserves together with reserve requirements affects the probability 
of reaching the corner states, and therefore, should affect the distribution of rates and quantities under 
any type of market structure.  
 
4. Simulations 
 
We simulate an economy with a reserve maintenance periods of T = 3 days and n = 12 banks. Each of 
these banks are endowed with A1 = 100 units of reserves. The reserve requirement is R = 300 for the 
whole period. This means that, in the aggregate, the system has enough reserves to satisfy the 
requirement. The lending rate is il = 5 percent and the deposit rate is id = 3 percent. This leaves a 200 
basis point corridor as in the Eurosystem. 
 
In order to generate a distribution of rates and quantities, the model will be solved for a variety of 
economies that differ upon the trade frictions we impose on market participants. The possibilities 
range from the frictionless case to autarchy. In the frictionless case banks meet in a single market 
place and all trades are centralised there. The equilibrium outcome of that economy can be 
characterised by a single interest rate and a distribution of quantities traded. This distribution depends 
on the heterogeneity of banks, that is, the levels of reserves they start the day with ( jta , j = 1,…, n) 
and the deficiencies they have ( jtd , j = 1,…, n). As we will see below these two variables will 
determine the supply of funds for each bank and, therefore, the amounts transacted in the market. In 
autarchy there is no trade and a distribution of shadow interest rates is obtained. These shadow prices 
are defined as the marginal cost of borrowing or lending the first unit of reserves and, therefore, its 
distribution will also depend upon the heterogeneity of banks on each day. 
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Between these two economies we can generate additional ones in the following manner. Think of an 
economy where, because of search or transaction costs, markets are segmented. They are like islands 
not connected with one another. Each of these separated markets can in principle generate a different 
price and a different amount traded because their composition in terms of the agents involved may 
differ from one to another. So, if we look at the economy as a whole, it will be characterised by a joint 
distribution of prices and quantities. Next, we can perform the experiment of increasing the 
transaction/search costs. When these costs are zero or very small, the optimal size of the market is the 
whole economy. This is what we call the frictionless case. As we increase these costs the size of these 
markets decrease and the solution converges to the autarchic case. The Appendix provides the details 
about the computation of rates and quantities traded. 
 
Before fully solving the model and to provide some intuition for the results below, we first compute 
the supply functions of an individual bank for a given sequence of expected market rates. Figure 1 
presents the supply functions of the “average” bank in the frictionless economy. For each day, it is 
assumed that the bank has not received any shock on previous days. In order to compute these 
functions, we have to provide the expected rate in the market. To keep the functions comparable 
between days, we assume that the expected rate is equal to the middle of the band (il + id)/2. We see 
how the elasticities are reduced gradually over time. The shape of these functions suggests that at the 
beginning of the maintenance period, banks are indifferent with respect to their reserve level. This 
means that they will not try to compensate liquidity shocks and the interest rate will be stable both 
over time and across banks. As the end of the period gets nearer, though, demands become more 
inelastic so banks have clearer targets with respect to a particular level of reserves. This implies more 
trade and more volatility of rates. 
 
To solve for the equilibrium prices and quantities we carry out a Monte Carlo experiment where we 
simulate Z = 1000 reserve maintenance periods identical to the one described at the beginning of the 
section. With respect to the shocks, we consider late shocks ( jtλ ) only. Here, jtλ  represents the 
uncertainty about the changes in the current account by the end of the day because of transfers that 
take place later in the day, clerical errors and the like. To construct these shocks, define as )(kjtλ  the 
random transfer of funds between banks k and j or the errors committed in accounting for a known 
transaction between these two banks. This transfer is assumed to be normal with mean 0 and standard 
deviation σ. If the shock is positive, funds are moved from bank k to bank j and if negative, bank j 
moves reserves to bank k. Assume 0)( =λ jjt . The shock jtλ , is, therefore equal to 
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λ=λ
n
k
j
t
j
t k
1
)(  
 
which follows a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation 
 
1−σ=σ nj . 
 
It is easy to verify that these shocks always sum up to 0 across banks, so no reserves enter or leave the 
system in the aggregate and have covariances and correlations equal to 
 
22 ])([)( σ−=λ−=λλ kEE jttktjtt  
and 
1
1)(),( −
−=σσ
λλ=λλρ
n
E
kj
k
t
j
ttk
t
j
tt , 
 
respectively. In our simulation, the standard deviation of individual transfers is σ = 20 which implies 
that banks are subject to shocks which are jointly normal with standard deviation of σj = σ (n-1)1/2 = 
66.33 and a correlation between shocks of ),( kt
i
tt λλρ  = -0.09. 
 
The rationale to model shocks in this way is as follows. Even if no reserves enter or leave the system, 
there is aggregate uncertainty in this economy. The reason is that, given the finite number of banks, 
prices and trade are not going to be independent on how reserves are reshuffled among them. In this 
sense, market segmentation will play a crucial role in linking different distributions of reserves into 
different prices. We will show that even in this simple case with no shocks that change the overall 
supply of reserves, the statistical properties of prices and quantities traded follow the stylised facts to 
be found from the data. 
 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 report descriptive statistics for the state of the system defined by the initial levels of 
reserves )( jta , average daily deficiencies [ )1/( +− tTd jt ] and trade ( jtb ) for sessions 2 and 3 and for 
different sizes of the groups h = {2 ,3, 4, 6, 12}. Let )(zd jt  be the average daily deficiency of bank j = 
{1, ..., n} in session t = {1, ..., T} of the simulation z = {1, ..., Z}. The column labelled “mean” in 
Table 2 corresponds to the average deficiency and is computed as  
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The column labelled “σts” is the standard deviation of the average deficiency computed across 
simulations, that is, 
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Finally, the column labelled “σcs” is the average of the cross section standard deviation, that is, 
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Computations for jta  and 
j
tb  in Tables 1 and 3 are equivalent. 
 
The initial level of reserves ( jta ) is an exogenous variable. This means that its distribution does not 
depend on the market structure as it is shown in Table 1. Because all banks start identical, deficiencies 
on t = 2 are also exogenous, though. On t = 3 as market groups get larger, deficiencies become smaller 
and less volatile as banks take advantage of trade. We observe that, for a given size of the group, the 
volatility of aggregate variables like the equilibrium interest rate or aggregate trade is larger on the last 
day. Also, we see that as the size of the group increases, the aggregate uncertainty decreases. Table 3 
shows that banks respond to the larger uncertainty with more trade (compare columns for t = 2 and t = 
3 in Table 3). As the size of the groups increase there is also more trade, which is why aggregate 
uncertainty decreases for the economy as a whole. 
 
Table 4 reports statistics for the interest rate. First, we compute a measure of the aggregate interest rate 
for this economy. For that, we select banks that make positive loans and compute a weighted average 
of their rates. The weights are the percentage of the loans over the whole amount transacted that 
session.5 We compute the square of the change between the aggregate interest rate that session and the 
value on the previous one. The average of that series shows in the column labelled σts. It gives an 
indication of how volatile the aggregate interest rate is in the time series dimension. We also compute 
                                                     
5 This is the way the EONIA is computed. 
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the cross section volatility of rates for banks that make loans in the market. The average of the 
corresponding cross section variance is reported in the column σcs. It gives an indication on how 
disperse rates are. We observe, the aggregate interest rate is more volatile on the last day, both in the 
time as well as in the cross section dimension. Furthermore, as groups become larger, the volatility 
decreases, since there is more room for trade. 
 
In Table 4 we also show the correlation between both measures of dispersion in the column ρ(ts,cs). 
We report two ways of calculating this correlation. The first one is constructing a time series of 
measures of dispersion and look at their correlation. The result is collected in the column t = 2, 3. The 
second one is for each session separately. Both measures of dispersion are very positively correlated as 
we find in the data. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the use of the standing facilities for different days and size of market groups. 
Table 5 shows the probability of going to the lending and deposit facilities. For each realisation for the 
Monte Carlo simulation, this probability is computed for each bank given the distribution of shocks 
and then those probabilities are averaged over banks and simulations. Table 6 includes the expected 
use that all banks will make of the facilities, again averaged over all realisations of the simulation. As 
mentioned before, on the first day there is no trading so the use of the standing facilities is exogenous 
and, therefore, independent of the size of the market groups. We see that the recourse to the standing 
facilities is both more likely and larger on the last day of the maintenance period than on previous 
days. It is interesting to notice that the use of the lending facility is very similar for the three days, 
while the use of the deposit facility peaks on the last day as we observe in the data. Finally, as market 
groups become larger, banks find more opportunities to trade among themselves and go less to the 
standing facilities. 
 
Out of the theoretical model and the simulation results we can draw a set of conclusions relevant for 
the empirical analysis. It is a clear prediction of the model that interest rate volatility increases towards 
the end of the maintenance period. The increase in volatility in a time series dimension with the 
evolution of the maintenance period is not new in the literature. A large number of papers analyse this 
phenomenon. Hamilton (1996), Wurtz (2001) are just two examples for the US and the European case 
respectively. However, the cross-section definition of interest rates, that is, departures from the law of 
one price, have not been considered in the literature. The omission may have been due to lack of 
relevant data. Associated with these larger price volatilities we find a larger volume of trade, both in 
the market across banks and with the central bank through the use of the standing facilities. This larger 
trade is also concentrated at the end of the reserve maintenance period. 
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5.  DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
 
The data used in this study consists of interest rates obtained by the major European banks when they 
lend funds in the overnight market. In particular, each data point represents the average interest rate 
charged in that day by each lending bank. The sample covers 64 banks from January 4th 1999 to 
November 9th 2002. This data set was provided by the European Banking Federation (EBF) and is the 
one used to compute the time series for the EONIA. The number of observations on a particular day 
may be smaller than the number of banks, though, simply because some banks may not be active on 
that day or because they are borrowing. Furthermore, the number of banks in the panel is not always 
the same because the EONIA panel has changed in different occasions to include or exclude some 
banks. 
 
Most of the papers analysing the market microstructure (see Hartmann, Manzanares and Manna (2000) 
as an example) usually construct their databases from quotes of the brokers in Reuters. This has 
several problems. First, they only cover the part of the market that is traded through brokers, missing 
the larger transactions that are usually done directly between banks. Additionally, brokers, when the 
market is very active, do not necessarily report the quotes to Reuters. Therefore, another big part of the 
market is missing. Finally, the quotes do not oblige the counterparts to trade, much more when the 
overnight market is uncollaterized, which implies that different rates are charged to different banks 
because of the different risks associated with particular transactions. On the contrary, in the EBF 
database the observations correspond to actual trades. 
 
Obviously there are some drawbacks to the EBF database. First, we only have information for average 
rates during the day. That characteristic makes it not possible to say anything about the intra-day 
activity. Second, we have only information about the lenders, not the borrowers. We cannot test any 
implication that theory could tell us about the borrowers’ behaviour. 
 
6.  SOME PROPERTIES OF THE DATA 
 
Table 4 collects most of the testable implications of the theoretical model. We observe positive 
correlation of cross-section and time series volatility for the whole sample whatever is the group size 
(column 1, labelled ρ(ts,cs) for t=2,3). In addition, in any given day, we also observe this positive 
correlation, for most of the group sizes, particularly striking at the end of the reserve maintenance 
period (columns 4 and 7, labelled ρ(ts,cs) for t=2 and for t=3 respectively). The implications of these 
positive correlations on the data are stronger than the associated to the whole sample (column 1). As 
shown in Table 4, the theoretical model implies than the positive correlation is associated, not only to 
the fact that both variances increases at the end of the maintenance period, but also, given that for any 
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given day we observe positive correlation of variances, that days with higher (lower) time series 
volatility than the expected for that day, will come associated with higher (lower) than expected cross-
section volatility. Therefore, the strongest consequence of the model is the positive correlation of the 
shocks to both volatilities.  
 
However, before testing the implications of the model, we should discard some alternative 
explanations that could imply the same predicated properties. For example, one of the key assumptions 
of the model is the fact that no bank dominates the market. If a set of banks dominate the market we 
could think on strategic behaviour that banks could play to increase rates when the system is short, 
affecting the volatility of rates. On the contrary, the model assumes that banks are equal at the 
beginning of the maintenance period and they differ from each other in the path of the shocks that they 
receive over the maintenance period. If this is the case, individual excess profits, calculated as the 
interest rate obtained by the lending of their reserves minus the average rate obtained for those 
reserves, should be uncorrelated across maintenance periods. We test this hypothesis and we accept it 
at 5 percent in all but two of the banks of the sample. However, the models allows (and actually 
predicts) that profits for a given bank, maybe correlated over time, within a reserve maintenance 
period. We test this hypothesis and we reject the null of no correlation in more than 20 percent of the 
banks. We conclude from these findings that even though banks play different roles in different 
maintenance periods, idiosyncratic shocks allow them to keep advantage positions within the reserve 
maintenance period. 
 
Another way of testing the non-strategic behaviour of banks, as assumed by the model, is to 
decompose the excess profits6 obtained by a bank in a given maintenance period between the profits 
obtained by “market power” (i.e. on a given day, how much a bank makes for its reserves in excess of 
the market rate) and the “timing” (i.e. on a given maintenance period, how much a bank makes 
because it lends when the rates are higher than the average rate of the period). If the assumptions of 
the model are correct, these two sources of excess profits should be uncorrelated, because no bank 
should have a strategic behaviour in playing the markets game. These assumptions are corroborated by 
the data. No bank seems to be systematically playing the game of waiting until the rates are high to get 
advantage of its market power and the correlation between these two sources of excess profits is even 
negative (-0.13). 
 
An additional assumption of the model is that a three period maintenance period is a good 
representation of the one-month maintenance period. If three periods are enough, there should not be 
                                                     
6 Excess profits is defined as the returns obtained by a bank in a given maintenance period and the average return 
obtained by the funds on that period. 
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any differences in the density function of the data in the first T-2 periods of the maintenance period, 
(where T is the number of days of the maintenance period). The idea is that those T-2 periods can be 
considered repetitions of the same distribution. In order to address this question empirically, we need 
to analyse the density function of the rates on different days of the maintenance period. We have 
information on the different rates that banks have obtained for their reserves and we estimate the 
distribution function for each day of the maintenance period. We consider as the same day days that 
have the same distance to the end of the reserve maintenance period. For example, to calculate the 
distribution function of the last day of the reserve maintenance period, we use all the 45 distributions 
of the end of the maintenance period days that we have in the sample. We do the same for all the other 
days. At the end we have 20 distributions; for the last day of the maintenance period, the day before, 
up to the day t-19. Given that, on average we have around 40 banks active on a given day, this implies 
an average of 1800 observations for each of these distributions. We calculate the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test of the equality of these 20 distributions. We accept the null that distributions are the 
same (doing pairs of KS tests) for all days of the maintenance period but the last 4. A good way of 
checking the intuition behind this result can be seen in Figure 2. In this Figure we plot in a two-
dimensional scale the distance between the KS statistics for each pair of distributions. Obviously, 
these distances cannot be represented in an Euclidean space because they are 20-dimensional. 
However, we use multi-dimensional scaling to reduce these dimensions to two. The purpose of this 
technique is to obtain the two-dimensional projection of a N dimensional space. The intuition is that 
the Euclidian distances measured in the plane will be an approximation of the distances in the N-
dimensional space. Points which are close in the plot will be close in the actual measure of the 
distance across the distributions.  As we can see from the plot, the last days are away from the group 
of the rest of the days. Empirical evidence seems to corroborate that just using a few days is not a bad 
approximation of what is going on in the markets. 
  
Finally, an important question needs to be addressed: Does the “law of one price” hold in this market? 
This is a key question, because all the theoretical analysis tries to explain deviations from this law. 
The data seems to confirm the relevance of the problem addressed by the theory. Figure 3 plots 
different measures of spreads across banks, standard deviations of rates (weighted by the value 
transacted and not weighted) on a given day and difference between rates corresponding to the ninth 
and the first deciles. All these measures contain the same message. Even though the asset transacted in 
the market is extremely homogeneous (reserves) different prices are paid at different moments for this 
homogeneous good. There is a clear violation of the law of one price. 
  
One important caveat should be recognised. In our data, it may appear as if the law of one price is 
violated if rates vary during the day and banks lend funds at different hours. Given that banks reports 
only daily averages can this be the source of the dispersion of interest rates in the dataset? In order to 
 19
address this question, we need to depart from our database and check for other sources of information 
on daily patterns. We are reluctant to use Reuters data because we know that they are not binding and 
that most of the transactions, when there is more action on the market, are made by direct contact 
across banks. We prefer to use Italian electronic market data (emid). This database captures quotes that 
are binding for the banks, giving us some more accurate information on the actual situation of the 
market. We have tick data for six months (from March to September 2002) which represent around 
260,000 observations. In order to check the dispersion of the markets in each period of time we 
calculate volatilities of quotes every five minutes. These volatilities are plotted in Figure 4. As we can 
see, the volatility of rates is an end-of-the-day phenomenon. Figure 5 shows the average variation of 
the average rate quoted every five minutes with respect to the previous five minutes and the previous 
hour. Looking at this graph, it is clear that the variation of rates occurs at the end of the day. We 
conclude that dispersion across banks cannot be due to the fact that banks go to the market at different 
moments. The law of one price holds for most of the day and it seems to be at the end of the day when 
we observe the dispersion of rates across banks. We can then claim that different prices across banks 
cannot be explained by any intra day pattern.  
 
Based on the previous analysis, it seems that the assumptions of the theoretical model are supported by 
the data. The fact that we have presented evidence against a big set of alternative explanations for the 
pattern of the rate allows us to concentrate on searching for empirical support to the conclusions of the 
model. These conclusions are summarized by the increase in volatility of rates both in the time series 
as well as in the cross section dimension as we get closer to the end of the maintenance period together 
with the positive correlation between both volatilities. Additionally, Furthermore, thers hould be an 
increase in trade in the market and a larger use of both facilities also at the end of the reserve 
maintenance period. 
 
7.  TIME SERIES AND CROSS SECTION VOLATILITY 
 
The main goal of our analysis is to study the relation between time series and cross section volatility of 
rates. We measure time series volatility as the absolute variation of rates from a day to the next. For 
the cross section volatility we use the standard deviation of rates where each of the rates obtained by a 
bank is weighted by the amount transacted on the day. 
 
The first prediction of the theory is the fact that volatility increases at the end of the maintenance 
period both in a time series and in a cross section dimension. This fact can be clearly appreciated in 
Figure 6, where we represent the average absolute variation of rates in different days of the 
maintenance period and in Figure 7, where we represent the cross section volatility. 
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One way to see how close these two volatilities move together would be to calculate the correlation 
between the actual time series volatility (variation in overnight rates squared) and the definition of the 
cross section volatility that we consider (in our case, the standard deviation of the rates on a given 
day). The correlation between these two series is indeed high, namely 0.62. However, a few caveats 
should be taken into account when interpreting this number. Several features of the market may affect 
both volatilities in the same direction. From the theoretical model we have learned that some 
explanatory variables, particularly end of reserve maintenance periods should affect the time series 
and cross section volatility in the same direction. Similarly, other calendar effects associated with 
larger than average volatilities of payments like end of the months, end of the year, etc… may also be 
important. However, from the theoretical model, we have learned that the correlation between these 
two volatilities should be deeper than the one that comes from the fact that some exogeneous 
variables, as the calendar effect, affect both volatilities in the same direction. We expect that 
unexpected movements in the volatility of one of the variables will be correlated with unexpected 
movements in the same direction of the other volatility, as stated in table 4. Looking at the different 
tables of the simulation exercise, we have learned that, not only cross section and time series move 
together in relation with time in the maintenance period, but shocks to the liquidity of the system shift 
away the time path of both series at the same time. According to theory, the correlation should be 
positive and strongly significant. This conclusion could represent the deepest consequence of our 
theory, the fact that not only expected volatilities move together but shocks to these volatilities also 
move in the same direction.  
 
In order to separate the expected of the unexpected component of the volatility of each of the variables 
we estimate a reduced form model where we include the explanatory variables described in the 
theoretical part.  
 
The estimated model is the following: 
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where the correlation of εt and ut is equal to 0. The variables Xt and Vt represent the set of calendar 
dummies that affect the mean and the volatility of the rates. These variables are carefully defined in 
Table 7. This model follows Pérez Quirós and Rodríguez Mendizábal (2003) but has been extended to 
consider the cross section dimension of our problem. The mixture of normals for the time series 
volatility equation is standard in the literature of the empirical analysis of the overnight rate to capture 
the long tails of the distributions of rates. We find that this mixture is not necessary when describing 
the cross section volatility of rates.  
 
It is important to point out that an estimation like the proposed one has no implications on the 
direction of causality from the time series to the cross section volatility or viceversa. It would be 
equivalent to estimate the previous equations allowing for the shocks to be correlated. The estimated 
coefficient ξ will be the estimated correlation of the unexpected shocks to the variances. It turns out it 
is positive and extremely significant (p-value =0.00).  
 
The results of estimating jointly (13), (14), (15), and (16) are displayed in Table 7. According to our 
statistical analysis the main implications of the theory are supported by the data. Cross section and 
time series volatility are highly correlated even controlling for all the explanatory variables that 
explain the joint behaviour of both. One more implication can also be added. As predicted by Tables 5 
and 6, the use of the facilities is also closely related to the end of the maintenance period. Figure 8 
plots the average use of these facilities on different days of the maintenance period. The graph in this 
case is probably more illustrative than any formal test that we might do; as predicted by the theory, the 
use of these facilities is clearly linked to the end of the maintenance period, with a stronger link in the 
case of the deposit facility. 
 
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we provide a parsimonious model of the daily funds market equilibrium. We build on the 
original seminal contribution made by Poole (1968). The essential feature of the models of overnight 
market equilibrium, in the tradition of Poole, is that commercial banks do not know their end-of-day 
position at the time of trading. This reflects the fact that credit institutions have imperfect information 
and monitoring systems. In addition, we assume market segmentation and banks subject to 
heterogeneous liquidity shocks banks to generate a distribution of prices and quantities traded across 
banks. With these assumptions, the main prediction of the model is a high positive correlation between 
the conditional time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of interest rates. The reason for 
this result resides in the reduction of the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks as the system 
approaches the end of the reserve maintenance period.  
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In our research we used the EONIA panel database, kindly made available by the European Banking 
Federation (EBF). The database includes daily information on the lending rates applied by 
contributing commercial banks. Interest rates correspond to actual trading rates. After ruling out 
alternative explanations, the data clearly confirms the prediction of the theory: There exists a strong 
positive correlation between the average time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of 
interest rates for the whole sample and also conditional to the day of the maintenance period. 
Therefore, periods with higher (lower) than expected time series price volatility come associated to 
periods with higher (lower) than expected cross section dispersion of rates.  
 
One immediate implication of the model concerns the level of reserves and the timing of liquidity 
provision by the central bank. With the nonlinearities imposed by the operational framework of 
monetary policy when and how much liquidity is made available become relevant. In particular, a 
change in reserve requirements compensated by an increase in liquidity is not neutral and should affect 
the distribution of rates and quantities traded in the market. Additionally, the model is fully flexible on 
many dimensions and could be extended to analyse other issues in this market. For example, we could 
distinguish between large and small banks, and between universal and investment banks. It could also 
consider networks of banks structured in a systematic way. It is a promising area for further work. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
This appendix explains the determination of the market rate and the quantities traded in each of the 
market settings considered in the paper.  
 
Case a: Frictionless economy. The particular form of the equilibrium solution depends upon the 
market structure considered. First, assume that all trades are centralized in a market place and there is 
perfect information about banks situation in terms of the values of jTs  and its distribution. In this case, 
there is a single interest rate that clears the market, T
j
T ii = . From (9) the supply of funds by bank j on 
the last day of the reserve maintenance period is 
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which yields the equilibrium rate 
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In this expression DT and AT are the per capita level of deficiency and initial reserves, respectively: 
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Then, the supply of funds by bank j, jTb , becomes 
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so a bank will be supplying or demanding reserves in the market depending on whether the “individual 
excess reserves” jT
j
T ad −  are below or above the aggregate value. Notice a bank can have excess 
reserves, jTd  < 
j
Ta , and still borrow them because the average value is even lower. As we have seen, 
in that situation reserves will be cheap.  
 
Although prices and quantities can be computed exactly on the last day of the maintenance period, it is 
not so on other days. For t < T, solution is approximated using a grid for the individual shocks. Then 
an iteration procedure is used to gether with (11) to find the sequence of market rates for those days. 
 
Case b: Autarchy. Now assume that banks are on their own so no trades are possible. Since banks are  
isolated, for the last day of the maintenance period jTb = 0 and the shadow rate is 
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For the previous days jtb = 0 and (11) is used together with the grid of the shocks to approximate the 
distribution of rates.  
 
Case c: Market groups. In order to generate intermediate cases, where there is a cross section of 
both, prices and quantities, assume we form random groups of size h. If h is n we are in the frictionless 
market (case a). If h is 1 we have autarchy (case b). Since each group is isolated in terms of trading of 
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funds we take each of them as a single economy and apply the formulas for the frictionless case. 
However, because the shocks move reserves among the groups, the aggregate state of each group may 
change on each day. The Montecarlo simulation is just a long series of possible trajectories for these 
initial states. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for initial reserves (at) 
 t = 2 t = 3 
s mean σts σcs mean σts σcs 
2 100 - 64.37 100 - 91.56
3 100 - 64.37 100 - 91.56
4 100 - 64.37 100 - 91.56
6 100 - 64.37 100 - 91.56
12 100 - 64.37 100 - 91.56
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for daily deficiencies (dt) 
 t = 2 t = 3 
s mean σts σcs mean σts σcs 
2 104.3 5.08 33.80 114.7 13.11 89.69
3 104.3 5.08 33.80 111.6 10.20 81.29
4 104.3 5.08 33.80 110.3 8.77 77.01
6 104.3 5.08 33.80 109.2 7.51 71.69
12 104.3 5.08 33.80 108.1 6.21 66.48
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for lending (bt) 
 t = 2 t = 3 
s mean σts σcs mean σts σcs 
2 296.5 60.91 77.30 492.5 37.47 101.6
3 381.3 74.18 92.06 584.7 44.13 121.8
4 414.4 77.87 95.56 635.3 47.59 131.0
6 441.7 82.33 100.7 687.4 50.42 140.1
12 464.1 86.61 106.4 749.4 57.62 155.6
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for interest rates 
 t = 2, 3 t = 2 t = 3 
s ρ(ts,cs) σts σcs Ρ(ts,cs) σts σcs ρ(ts,cs) 
2 0.1393 0.0705 0.3337 -0.0048 0.1021 0.5834 0.1417 
3 0.2170 0.0385 0.3177 0.2111 0.0573 0.4818 0.1754 
4 0.3293 0.0267 0.2832 0.3079 0.0434 0.4138 0.3065 
6 0.3247 0.0145 0.2078 0.4496 0.0272 0.2831 0.2812 
12 - 0.0047 - - 0.0028 - - 
 
 
Table 5 
Average probability of using the standing facilities 
 Lending Deposit 
s t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
2 0.0658 0.1157 0.1524 0.0013 0.1697 0.4807 
3 0.0658 0.1090 0.1405 0.0013 0.1380 0.4788 
4 0.0658 0.1038 0.1376 0.0013 0.1204 0.4773 
6 0.0658 0.0990 0.1369 0.0013 0.0993 0.4705 
12 0.0658 0.0918 0.1428 0.0013 0.0745 0.4564 
 
 
Table 6 
Average expected use of the standing facilities 
 Lending Deposit 
s t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
2 29.02 30.74 32.01 18.71 33.92 72.85 
3 29.02 30.45 31.39 18.71 31.57 65.85 
4 29.02 30.25 31.32 18.71 30.50 61.53 
6 29.02 30.08 31.34 18.71 29.54 56.52 
12 29.02 29.84 31.65 18.71 28.53 50.43 
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Table 7 
Estimation of equations (13), (14), (15) and (16) 
A: Mean parameters 
 Time series Cross section 
 Estimation Std. Error Estimation Std. Error 
β1t -0.213 (0.049) - - 
β 2t -0.679 (0.763) - - 
β 3t 4.296 (0.493) - - 
     
B: Variance parameters 
 Time series Cross section 
 Estimation Std. Error Estimation Std. Error 
λ1t -6.481 (0.746) -9.810 (0.061) 
λ2t 3.040 (0.273) 2.491 (0.113) 
λ3t 0.589 (0.267) - - 
λ4t 1.873 (0.412) 2.606 (0.683) 
λ5t 1.206 (0.296) 1.456 (0.149) 
λ6t 0.165 (0.200) 0.113 (0.076) 
λ7t 0.237 (0.248) 0.428 (0.110) 
λ8t 0.833 (0.267) - - 
ξ  0.403 (0.045) - - 
δ11 0.209 (0.039) 0.359 (0.022) 
δ12 0.541 (0.125) 0.049 (0.023) 
δ13 1.079 (0.227) - - 
δ21 0.030 (0.042) - - 
δ21 0.217 (0.051) - - 
σ 0.556 (0.043) 1.476 (0.149) 
p 0.036 (0.004) - - 
 
The parameters βjt, j = 1, 2, 3, are the coefficients of the variables Xjt in equation (13) while the parameters λjt, j = 1, 2, …, 9, are the 
coefficients of the variables Vjt in equation (14) where: 
X1t = Constant X2t = End of maintenance period X3t = Beginning of maintenance period   
V1t = Constant V2t = End of maintenance period V3t = Beginning of maintenance period  
V4t = End of year V5t = End of month V6t = Friday  
V7t = Council meeting V8t = Day after council meeting  
The parameters δ11 to δ21 also appear in equation (14). The variable “End of maintenance period” includes the four last days of the MP, 
except when the MP ends on a Wednesday. In this case, there is no end of maintenance period effect because the banks have the last open 
market operation to adjust their balances. Similar estimation results are obtained when the variable “End of maintenance period” only 
includes the days after the last open market operation. 
FIGURE 1
Excess supply functions for average bank in the nonlinear case
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FIGURE 2
Distances of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
Note: The graph plots the multidimensional scaling representation of the distances of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests of equalities of the distribution functions of rates in different days of the maintenance period
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Note: Var1 is the difference between the rates paid by the Euro that represents the 10% cheaper and the 10% most
expensive. Var2 is the standard deviation of rates weighted by the amount of Euro transacted by each bank and Var3 is
the standard deviation of rates when each rate (each bank) is considered as one observation.
FIGURE 3
Different measures of dispersion of rates across banks
FIGURE 4
Intraday volatility of rates
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Note: The graph plots the average volatility of quotes for every 5 minute period interval  for the emid data
in the period Mach to September 2002.
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The graph plots the average variation of the average rate quoted every five minutes with respect to the previous 
five minutes period and the previous hour. Emid data in the period Mach to September 2002.
FIGURE 5
Intraday volatility of rates
FIGURE 6
Time series volatility of the Eonia
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The graph plots the average absolute variation of Eonia rates in each day of the maintenance period
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The graph plots the average cross section standard deviation of Eonia rates in each day of the maintenance period
FIGURE 7
Cross section volatility of the Eonia
FIGURE 8
Use of standing facilities
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The graph plots the average use of the standing facilities in each day of the maintenance period
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